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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY APPLY ONLY WHERE THE
IMMUNITY IS QUALIFIED, NOT WHERE THE
IMMUNITY IS ABSOLUTE
Respondent argues in her Brief that immunity is waived in
the instant case by specific waivers set forth _n the Governmental Immunity Act.

See Brief of Respondent at 2-3.

Such

would be the case if the first paragraph of Section 63-30-3 of
the Act were applicable here.

The first paragraph of that

section, however, does not apply.

Rather, it is the second

paragraph of Section 63-30-3 which is applicable to this case.
The Section, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private
facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities
are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953, as amended).

As can be seen by

the clear, unambiguous and specific language of the second

paragraph of the section, repair and operation of flood and
storm systems by a governmental entity are governmental
functions for which absolute immunity attaches.
There is no language in the second paragraph suggesting
that the qualified immunity of the first paragraph of the
Section applies.

Rather, very explicit and specific language

in the second paragraph states clearly and graphically that for
the particular, specific governmental functions listed there,
that of management of flood waters and other natural disasters
and the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm
systems, an immunity with no qualifiers or waivers is
applicable.
In Utah, principles of statutory construction require that
specific provisions take precedent over general provisions.
See Ute-Cal Land Development v. Intermountain Stock Exchange,
628 P.2d 1278, 1282 n.15 (Utah 1981); Millett v. Clark Clinic
Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980).

Here, the second paragraph's

specific enumeration of particular types of governmental function, with clear language stating emphatically that immunity
applies, takes precedent over the general provisions of the
first paragraph.
Finally, where there is absolute immunity, no waivers are
applicable.

Only where the Act expressly allows a waiver, can

a waiver be considered.

See Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627
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(Utah 1983).

Thus, where, as here, a governmental entity's

repair or operation of a storm system allegedly caused injury,
the applicable immunity is not qualified and the Act's waivers
of immunity do not apply.
POINT II
LEGISLATIVE INTENT CAN BE DETERMINED FROM
THE FACE OF THE STATUTE
Respondent asserts that the 1984 amendment which added the
second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 to the Act "was intended as
protection only in times of flood."
4.

See Brief of Respondent at

If such is the case, why then did the Legislature add

superfluous language to the amendment giving immunity to the
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems?
If the amendment was intended to provide immunity only when
flood waters were present, then "the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems" during flooding conditions would be included within or encompassed by the plain and
ordinary meaning of "management of flood waters."
The Legislature uses words and phases "advisedly," and such
are to be given effect.
446 (Utah 1982).

West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445,

The use of the conjunctive "and" after the

phrase "management of flood waters and other natural disasters," followed by specific enumeration of the governmental
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activities of constructing, repairing and operating flood and
storm systems, indicates a clear intent to add to the statute
activities different than those of managing flood waters.
The legislative intent is clear from the plain language of
the statute.

Immunity is granted to governmental entities

while constructing or repairing or operating flood and storm
systems prior to, after, in anticipation of, in response to, or
to prevent or minimize damages from flooding.

In an arid,

desert state like Utah, flooding is likely to come from severe
thunderstorms.

The Legislature therefore included "storm

systems" in the statute to allow for governmental activities
specifically designed to deal with such, in addition to what
otherwise might be done with regard to flooding in general.
Incentive, or in other words, immunity from suit, is thereby
provided governmental entities which make a concerted effort to
avoid having to manage flood waters and be faced with the
injury or damage that naturally occur from actual flooding, by
constructing, repairing and operating flood and storm systems
when flood waters are not present.

These systems, by their

nature, are designed to alleviate, minimize or prevent flooding.
The Legislature, in its wisdom, deemed such governmental
functions to be worthy of unqualified immunity.

Both respon-

dent and the court below obviously disagree with that wisdom,
but such disagreement cannot be the basis for the lower court
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refusing to give effect to the literal wording and obvious
meaning of the statute. See West Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446; Gord
v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (1967).
POINT III
DISTRICT COURT RULINGS WERE CITED TO SUPPORT
THE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY OF SECTION 63-30-3
In this appellant's Brief, numerous state District Court
decisions were cited and attached as an appendix for the
purpose of showing this Court that the second paragraph of
Section 63-30-3 had been interpreted and applied by those
courts as granting absolute immunity to governmental entities
and employees for the governmental functions enumerated therein.

Respondent skews the rulings of the lower courts in an

attempt to find support for her assertion that the second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 applies only where flooding actually
occurs.

See Brief of Respondent at 5-7.

At issue in those

cases was the same legal issue posed here:

whether the second

paragraph of Section 63-30-3 grants absolute immunity to governmental entities for the management of flood waters and the
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems.
Universally, with the exception of the lower court in the
instant action, the state's District Courts have ruled that
absolute immunity does attach for those governmental functions.
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None of the rulings cited dealt with the other issue
presented here:

whether flood waters must be present before

Section 63-30-3 applies.

This appellant did not cite the

rulings as support for its argument on that specific issue, but
rather for the argument that Section 63-30-3 does in fact grant
immunity which is unqualified and absolute.

Reliance on these

lower court rulings for any other proposition here is
unwarranted.
POINT IV
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DISPUTE THE PRINCIPLES
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SET FORTH IN
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Nowhere in respondent's Brief does she dispute the legal
principles of statutory construction as set forth and relied
upon by this appellant in its Brief.
and are dispositive here.

The principles are sound

The lower court, in denying this

governmental entity's motion to dismiss, failed to apply these
principles.

Respondent failed to dispute them.

The error of

the lower court's interpretation of the statutory language,
then, must now be corrected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and in appellant's Brief,
the lower court's denial of Pleasant View City's motion to
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dismiss should be reversed and the matter should be remanded to
the District Court for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.
DATED this 7%)' day of March, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Allan L.OLarS
Christopher C. Fuller
Attorneys for Appellant
SCMCCF154
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